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In 2007 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made an historic ruling allowing foreign registrants to file IFRS-based financial statements without reconciling to U.S. GAAP. With that decision, the SEC changed its longstanding practice of adhering to a single set of accounting standards in the U.S. The decision diminishes the standing of two previously powerful institutions: U.S. GAAP and the SEC itself. We examine this important change drawing generally on institutional theory. We draw on several models to obtain insights into the likely roles of both regulator and regulatees, into the reasons the particular type of incremental change mechanism was observed, and into the influence of powerful transnational organizations on both the fact of change and timing of change. The key contribution of the article is to explicate incremental institutional change by examining specific mechanisms of change given the multi-level dynamic of accounting regulation. First, the interplay between national and transnational players and their coalitions shape what becomes an acceptable change mechanism. Second, layering mechanism, where new rules are attached to existing ones, is typically expected to destabilize existing institutions but can also decrease the push for broader change by layering regulation only for a particular segment. Finally, strategies employed by transnational accounting firms to stifle or promote institutional change are of interest. We focus specifically on their role in solidifying a transnational coalition of challengers to U.S. GAAP and therefore of apparently effecting the timing of the change. Documentary empirical data were drawn from the comment letters provided to the SEC in response to the proposed change, as well as from the SEC's final ruling document and from related releases. We analyze formal comment letters issued in response to the proposed 2007 rule, compare those to expectations based on theory and in some cases to prior public positions taken. We interpret our findings against the backdrop of meta level shifts in regulatory loci toward privatization and transnationalization of standard setting. 
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SEC’S ACCEPTANCE OF IFRS-BASED FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN EXAMINATION BASED IN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Introduction
In 2007, the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made an historic ruling related to the acceptability of accounting standards other than U.S. GAAP. The ruling allowed foreign issuers trading on U.S. markets to file IFRS-based financial statements without reconciling the information to U.S. GAAP. This event represented a marked change in the SEC's longstanding position regarding the acceptability of accounting standards other than U.S. GAAP for its registrants (Bealing, 1994; Bealing, Dirsmith, & Fogarty, 1996; Licata, Bremser, & Rollins, 1997). 
The 2007 decision has considerable ramifications for two previously powerful and longstanding institutions: U.S. GAAP and the SEC itself. As to U. S. GAAP, the decision had the effect of setting unreconciled IFRS-based statements on an equal footing with U.S. GAAP for foreign registrants. As more fully developed below, this is a particular type of incremental change mechanism, called layering, that is theorized to occur under certain environmental conditions (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). As to the SEC itself, the rule had the effect of ceding some of its control over the site and content of U.S. accounting regulation and diminishing its power relative to other standard setters. Because of the global significance of these two institutions, and the previous vehement and longstanding resistance of the SEC to this change, the purpose of this study is to examine that empirical episode against a framework of institutional theory and prior research. 
The study is responsive to calls by Edelman and Stryker (2005) and Bozanic, Dirsmith, and Huddart (2012) related to the conceptualization of the construct of regulation within empirical studies based on institutional theory. In that regard we adopt a conception of regulation as constructed, fluid and at least partially endogenous (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Bozanic et al., 2012). We also respond to calls for more theoretically focused examination of the incremental types of change that make up the majority of most actual empirical events (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005; Van der Heijden, 2011). Insights from theories of incremental change allow us to both address the particular type of change mechanism employed, and the role of particular types of challengers as relates to the timing of the change. 
The study is informed by the literature focused on the role of actors from outside national borders in shaping U.S. national regulatory processes. As noted by Botzem (2012), most regulatory power is still predominately assigned to public authorities. Nonetheless, it is increasingly the case that accounting regulatory change occurs in the context of new international financial architecture (Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009) where powerful, private sector, transnational players play a significant role (e.g., Botzem, 2012; Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Cooper & Robson, 2006; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Humphrey et al., 2009; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). 
In the empirical portion, we conduct a qualitative examination of the comment letters received by the SEC on the 2007 proposal to accept IFRS statements from foreign issuers. We examine the differential positions and legitimization strategies used by domestic, foreign, and transnational players as they attempt to influence the regulator. Because of the significance of the ruling to the SEC's own power, we also empirically examine the source, content and logic used by respondents regarding the SEC's role in the future. In order to demonstrate the particular significance of the positions taken by the transnational players, including the transnational accounting firms, we compared the positions of those players in a general sense to positions taken on a topically similar concept release that had previously been issued in 2000. 
We interpret our findings against the backdrop of meta-level shifts in regulatory loci, where the SEC appears to have compromised its prior strong position in light of the general phenomenon of privatization and transnationalization of standard setting. The removal of the reconciliation requirement contributed to the weakening of the existing structure of U.S. GAAP and the SEC, because it reduced the scope of their boundaries. However, the decision may have had less of an impact on the position of the SEC as a regulator. On the one hand the SEC has a clear reduction in relative standard-setting power, but the decision may have limited the flight of transnational firms from the U.S. stock exchanges over which the SEC has jurisdiction.    
The primary contribution comes from the integration of concepts from Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) incremental change theorizing with insights from the substantial literature on the role of powerful transnational organizations which allows for a multi-level study of international financial architecture. We provide a deeper understanding of the particular type of incremental change mechanism, a side-by-side layering of acceptable standards. While layering is typically associated with the destabilization of existing institutions, it can also decrease the push for broader change by layering regulation only for a particular segment. We contribute to the study of incremental institutional change by examining the role of the public behavior of the regulator and of influential regulatees, in the context of a change that had been previously adamantly resisted. Through the case illustration, we built on Djelic and Quack's (2003) claim that globalization does not necessarily destroy national institutions but instead pushes along their evolution and demonstrate how it occurs and why. 
Finally, strategies employed by transnational accounting firms to stifle or promote institutional change are of interest. We focus specifically on their role in solidifying a transnational coalition of challengers to U.S. GAAP and therefore of apparently effecting the timing of the change. Big 4 came to support the removal of the reconciliation and argued for choice in standards for foreign issuers but continued to support a single standard requirement for domestic issuers. Once the SEC faced a unified coalition of transnational challengers that included the transnational audit firms, it formulated a response that was acceptable to that coalition without producing a strong backlash from the powerful domestic exceptionalists. In facing a diverse constituency which includes certain powerful but provincially-oriented members of U.S. Congress, as well as internationally oriented financial statement preparers and accounting firms, the SEC evolved in both its standards and its scope toward a hybrid change solution that appears to temporarily satisfy both of those groups. 
The study proceeds as follows. First we discuss selected historical information on U.S. and transnational accounting standard setting. The next section includes discussion of models from institutional theory and of prior empirical literature that help frame our study and interpret our results. We then present a conceptualization of the empirical episode and description of the method. The following section provides a brief overview of the episode and discusses the study’s research method and results. The final section provides a discussion, interpretation and implications.
U.S. and Transnational Accounting Standard-setting
	In the United States, legal authority to establish accounting standards rests with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC was established in 1934 in connection with Congressional legislation known as the Securities Act of 1934. Along with the 1933 Securities Act, it was passed in response to the stock market crash of 1929, and was intended in part to rectify accounting deficiencies that contributed to it (Palmon, Peytcheva, & Yezegel, 2011). From the beginning, the SEC's mission was “to achieve and maintain stable and effective capital markets” for publicly-traded securities; as part of that mission it was awarded the statutory power to set U.S. financial accounting and reporting standards (Palmon et al., 2011). Over the years it has retained sole legal authority, although it has consistently delegated accounting standards setting to a private sector body. Since 1973, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been the private sector body promulgating accounting standards.
Although the SEC has seldom directly reversed the FASB or its predecessors, its influence on the FASB has nonetheless been significant (Palmon et al., 2011; Seligman, 1985). The SEC issues pronouncements and interpretations on topics that lack authoritative guidance or are ambiguous. These tend to influence the FASB agenda and frequently result in FASB disclosure guidance that is consistent with the SEC’s recommendations (Palmon et al., 2011). The SEC also has direct impact on financial reporting through its Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) process, which are authoritative for SEC registrants and in that regard have equal standing with FASB standards. For some time, the SEC was considered an effective example of a good securities regulator. The SEC’s centralized authority was seen as a model of functioning securities regulation (Prentice, 2005). A number of countries had designed their regulatory structure using the SEC as a template, including Germany, France, China, Korea, and Japan (Prentice, 2005). These considerations placed the institutions of U.S. GAAP and the SEC at a prime location of worldwide accounting regulation (De Lange & Howieson, 2006). 

Internationalization & the SEC 
In the last half of the 20th century, as financial and business environments became increasingly internationalized, some critics argued that domestic regulation of non-harmonized accounting standards was a barrier to trade and investment (Arnold, 2005). Partially in response to those concerns, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) was founded in 1973. The IASC successor entity, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) continues to advance IFRS as a unified global set of standards. One goal of these standards is to improve comparability and transparency of financial information (Alon & Dwyer, 2014; Daske et al., 2008). 
The adoption of IFRS by the EU countries was an important milestone in the journey toward widespread IFRS adoption. It was also the result of interesting political posturing. In the 1990s, European companies had begun to gravitate toward U.S. GAAP in an effort to attract investment. Not long thereafter, in 1995, the European Commission (EC) announced it would support the IASC standards and abort the efforts to create European accounting standard-setting body (Flower, 1997; Stolowy & Ding, 2003). It was asserted that the EC’s decision was motivated by the need to establish a common EU position on accounting issues and to have more influence over the IASC’s regulatory processes (Flower, 1997). Perhaps more interesting, it was claimed that ‘‘in the mind of not a few Europeans, the IASC represented a fortress against U.S. accounting imperialism—a fear that U.S. GAAP would come to dominate world accounting’’ (Zeff, 1998). 
At that point the SEC did not consider IFRS as a viable alternative for U.S. domestic reporting (Flower, 1997; De Lange & Howieson, 2006). Foreign issuers were required to reconcile their financial data to the U.S. GAAP. The Commission claimed that only U.S. GAAP adequately ensured investor protections (Levitt, 1998; Sutton 1997). Also, because IFRS are less detailed than U.S. GAAP, the SEC questioned if the core standards can be operational considering the interpretive issues (Sutton, 1997). In February of 2000, the SEC’s Commissioner maintained that “international accounting standards are now in their infancy and are, in large part, untested. It is virtually impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy the effectiveness of these standards upon implementation” (Hunt, 2000). For some time, this adamant position had considerable support; until early 2000, many informed observers considered U.S. accounting standards among the best and the most comprehensive in the world (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001, Levitt, 1998). Additionally, SEC and other critics expressed concern over the IASB's lack of enforcement ability. However, at the same time, SEC was actively involved in the development of IFRS processes and increased its support for the use of IFRS in other jurisdictions—a posture that De Lange and Hoiweson (2006) interpret as “double standard exceptionalism”. 
A comprehensive account of the SEC's interactions with IASB and its predecessor is beyond the scope of this paper. We highlight here a few of the important moments in the SEC/IASB relationship only to support our point that the SEC has been instrumental in influencing IFRS while at the same time trying to resist those standards for its home country. Since 1987 the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), where SEC plays an active role, has been involved with the IASC (Botzem 2012; Camfferman & Zeff, 2007; Simmons, 2001). In 2001, the IASC was restructured substantially along the lines advocated by the SEC; the Commission had insisted on such organization to better shield IASB from external influences (Botzem, 2012; De Lange & Howieson 2006). Shortly thereafter, the SEC publicly supported the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the FASB and the IASB regarding their commitment to developing high-quality compatible financial reporting standards (De Lange & Howieson, 2006). This Memorandum of Understanding, also known as the Norwalk agreement, was believed by some to be setting the stage for genuine and substantive convergence efforts (De Lange & Howieson, 2006). Nonetheless, there still exist fundamental differences both between (1) the operation of the SEC and FASB as compared to the IASB, and (2) between IFRS as compared to U.S. GAAP. Significant areas of distinction exist, including the regulatory structure, level of guidance, and enforcement. 
IFRS is developed by the IASB, which is a privately organized regulator funded mostly by contributions (Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Larson & Kenny, 2011). Due to somewhat voluntary nature of its funding, concerns about independence are frequently raised; additionally, the organization does not always receive the expected funds and tends to incur deficits (IFRS Foundation, 2012). The SEC itself is a public regulator funded by the U.S. Congress. Over the past 20 plus years, coincident with the extended period of deregulatory zeal in the U.S. Congress, the SEC has not always maintained real-dollar funding levels. On the other hand, the SEC's delegate, the FASB is consistently funded by fees assessed on publicly traded companies. 
One of the main underlying differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS is the level of guidance that each set of standards provides. U.S. GAAP is largely rules-based and provides extensive guidance on how to record transactions. IFRS, in contrast, are principles-based and rely heavily on expert judgment for application.​[1]​ Such flexibility is claimed to allow regulated organizations to construct the meaning of compliance (Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999). It also allows companies to maintain flavors of national standards (Nobes, 2006).
A final difference relates to enforcement. The SEC is tasked with ensuring compliance with reporting standards for issuers on the U.S. capital markets. The IASB is not responsible for the enforcement of IFRS and relies on national bodies to perform that function. While the SEC faces enforcement challenges due to the previously mentioned budget issues, the IASB faces enforcement challenges that are dependent upon the goodwill and competence of the various national bodies. 
In spite of the SEC’s public support for IFRS elsewhere, as recently as 2000, the SEC, the FASB, and the major transnational audit firms were publicly opposed to the use of unreconciled IFRS for its registrants. In a 2000 Concepts Release, the SEC sought feedback on a number of issues, including whether or not it should accept unreconciled IFRS-based statements. At that time, the vast majority of domestic respondents opposed it, as did the FASB. Perhaps more importantly, three of the (then) Big 5 transnational accounting firms commented and opposed unreconciled IFRS-based statements. This is in contrast to the 76% of other non-domestic participants who were then in favor of waving the reconciliation requirement (SEC, 2000). As further developed below, this is theoretically important because it reveals the absence of a publicly unified coalition of transnational players at that time. 
In summary, by the turn of the century the SEC had become an active and influential participant in the IFRS process while simultaneously maintaining that U.S. GAAP was the only quality standard for the U.S. market. This position on GAAP was shared by the FASB, and the public statements of a majority of the transnational accounting firms. With the 2002 accounting scandals, the credibility of U.S. GAAP came under fire (see for example, Bratton, 2004; Patsuris, 2002). In light of this new round of criticism of U.S. GAAP, and the SEC's already considerable support for IFRS in other jurisdictions, the SEC's adamant resistance to IFRS for it transnational and foreign registrants may have become harder to publicly justify.  

The Conceptualization of Regulation and Change in Institutional Theory
General Models of Institutions and Institutional Change
The study is rooted in institutional theory, in which the construct of institutions serves as a primary building block. Institutions are social forms and practices that achieved widespread acceptance and have demonstrated resilience (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2001). Institutions are also theorized to create a commonly understood social framework for behavior (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). A substantial body of literature relates to the stability of institutions, however, our interest is in the theorizing that addresses institutional change. 
General theories have acknowledged that institutional change is a political process reflecting the power of interested actors (Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004). Some models seek to explain the extent to which, and the ways in which, powerful actors enable change as compared to less powerful actors. The categories of dominant and fringe have been used in these models to characterize actors at extreme ends of the power continuum​[2]​ (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994; Djelic & Quack, 2003; Maguire & Hardy, 2009). Players are considered dominant if they hold a “central position in terms of power and social status” (Djelic & Quack, 2003, p. 24). Fringe players are those that lack dominant positions, centrality (Maguire & Hardy, 2009), and communication networks (Lounsbury, 2001). 
While the dominant/fringe continuum has been useful in explaining some changes, scholars noted that in an increasingly globalized environment, those categories may not be sufficient to classify the actors involved. Thus, Djelic & Quack (2003) offered an expanded model of institutional change based on two dimensions (the D & Q model). The first dimension was the previously mentioned centrality dimension reflected by either dominant or fringe location. The second dimension was the geographic scope dimension, on which players are labeled as either foreign, domestic, or transnational. The model loosely predicts how, based on the two-dimensional categorization, different groups participate and influence institutional change.
	D & Q posit that dominant local players normally are invested in the local structures and during periods of stability, tend to resist change (Djelic & Quack, 2003). In periods of critical challenges, however, domestic dominant players turn into active promoters of change (Djelic & Quack, 2003). Finally, because fringe players have less power and fewer resources than others, they must be unusually innovative to influence change processes; in the case of foreign fringe players, they may lack access to or interest in the process (Djelic & Quack, 2003). 
	A particular contribution of the D & Q model is its expanded theorizing regarding transnational players. In contrast to domestic dominants, transnational dominants, are theorized to be “unsatisfied with the preexisting institutional conditions characteristic of their country of origin” and are likely to be active promoters of institutional change (Djelic & Quack, 2003, p. 24). It is important to note that they are not addressing cases where transnational influences result in the destruction of national level institutions; rather they theorize cases where transnational influences result in changes in those institutions. D & Q assert generally that change is more likely when the national level institution comes in direct conflict with a transnational challenger. They note the significance of the emergence of truly transnational players with truly transnational identities and senses of self. These true transnationals become important, because they are not only powerful but they typically become carriers of an alternative set of rules down to the national level. 
Accounting scholars have taken up the issue of transnational influences. At the meta level, accounting scholars note that the evolution of accounting standards is occurring within an international financial architecture that is influenced by market actors, private authoritative bodies, and public authoritative bodies (e.g., Humphrey et al., 2009; Malsch & Gendron, 2011). In both auditing and financial accounting, regulators and professional bodies are moving toward global-level governance. Increasingly, the ideological focus at the global level has been one of free-market orientation in general, and on satisfying information needs of the capital market participants in particular (e.g., Botzem, 2012; Power, 2010).

Models Specific to Change in Formal Regulation
The role of law and regulation has always been an important element in institutional theory, and a number of models specifically addressing formal regulation have evolved over time. In early models, law and regulation were often treated as coercive, concrete and exogenous force; regulators could not only establish rules but could enforce conformity (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Scott, 2001). From that older perspective, regulation was perceived to unilaterally shape the functioning of economic actors (Coglianese & Kagan, 2007). Some recent treatments of regulation are more complicated. The regulatory capture perspective offers a view on the other end of the spectrum where regulated organizations are perceived to have enough power to directly control regulators and regulatory change. In this perspective, the “captured” regulators are theorized to advocate the interests of parties they should be regulating in a fairly overt manner (e.g., Horwitz, 1986; Luchansky & Gerber, 1993; Richardson, 2009). 
	A number of authors are critical of both the previously discussed extreme treatments (Bozanic et al., 2012, Cooper & Robson, 2006, Edelman & Stryker, 2005). Instead, these authors prefer to theorize regulation as mutually an influence on, as well as influenced by, the economic structures within the fields it seeks to regulate. These middle ground perspectives still acknowledge the operation of power and power struggles in the regulatory process, but in a less overt and determinative fashion than advanced in regulatory capture theory (e.g., Bozanic et al., 2012; Edelman & Stryker, 2005).   
Bozanic et al. (2012) provided empirical insight on this view of regulation by examining an SEC change of rules related to the issue of insider trading. Toward that end, they examined the positions taken and the affective tones of comment letters issued in response to the proposed regulation. They found that the final ruling restricted options but not as stringently as the initial proposal; they interpret this as evidence the regulator has been influenced by the regulatees. Additionally, they found that the SEC was disproportionally attentive to comments from the legal profession and the securities and investment industry, and that the SEC relied disproportionately on what Bozanic et al. (2012) classified as “credentialed” organizations in their choice of respondents to reference in their final ruling. The authors interpreted those credentialed organizations as being most likely ideologically allied with the corporate executives whose actions stood to be most restricted by the rule, and would therefore be perceived as credible by those executives.

Mechanisms of Incremental Change
	A common critique of institutional theorizing is its over-emphasis on sudden change and exogenous shocks as the cause of change (Djelic & Quack 2003; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Mahoney and Thelen (2010) advanced model of gradual change that theorizes the role played by certain endogenous elements in determining the particular type of change mechanism that emerges. They argue that gradual change is empirically common and theoretically interesting in its own right. Their treatment is political/critical, in that they explicitly recognize the distributional properties of institutions as being an important factor in understanding when and how the institution changes. 
 	Mahoney and Thelen (2010) posit a two factor model to explain differences in the types of change mechanisms that have been observed in the literature. They focus on four types of change mechanisms: displacement; layering; drift; and conversion. A “displacement” occurs when the old rules are completely replaced by the new rules. A “layering” occurs when new rules are set up aside the old rules, without replacing the old rules. “Drift” occurs when the old rules are not replaced but merely neglected or not enforced. Finally “conversion” occurs when old rules are not replaced but are opportunistically reinterpreted or reapplied. The two factors theorized to determine which mechanism will emerge are: (1) the level of discretion in the interpretation or enforcement of an institution’s rules and (2) the veto possibilities of actors that wish to maintain the status quo. We discuss layering below because it is the type reflected in the SEC proposal that we are studying. 
Layering involves “the introduction of new rules on top or alongside existing ones” (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 15; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Layering is theorized to be more likely when supporters of the status quo have strong veto power and when enforcement of rules is likely (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Van der Heijden, 2011). In such circumstances, powerful veto players can protect the old institution from being completely replaced, but cannot thwart the addition of new elements alongside the old practices (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). New layers may not initially challenge the existing institutions, but in the long-run they can sometimes undermine existing structures and lead to eventual transformation (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). The theorized agents of change in a layering mechanism are challengers who want new rules but who are willing to work within the existing system to get them, and to follow the old rules in the interim.  
The previous review of selected literature leads us to several summary observations in regard to the empirical episode we are examining. First, we expect to observe mutual influences of the powerful regulatees or their surrogates on the regulator, as well as the obvious direction of influence of the regulator on the regulated. As further developed below, we expect to observe strong influence of neoliberal ideology. We expect powerful transnational organizations to be the most influential of the regulatees. In combining the insights from Djelic and Quack (2003) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010), we expect layering to occur only when a sufficiently powerful set of transnational challengers come together in a coalition. This is because the veto power of the SEC is essentially absolute, therefore change must come through the system. Since the Big 4 international accounting firms are among the most powerful of the transnational participants with an interest in accounting standards, we next review the literature relevant to their role. 

Dominance of International Accounting Firms 
	Botzem (2012) has observed that “globally active auditing firms” have come to play a dominant role in international standard setting. Supporting this, prior studies have examined how the Big 4 effectively replaced professional associations and national regulators to become the site of professionalization and de facto regulators. This resulted partially by virtue of their size and ability to influence standard setting but more importantly by their influence on subsequent worldwide interpretation and application of standards (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Cooper & Robson, 2006; Suddaby et al., 2007). This shift in professionalization is more than just a shift in site however, but one of ideology as well. As part of an extensive review of academic and non-academic literature about the Big 4 (then the Big 5), Suddaby et al. reached the following conclusion, capturing the firms' ideology, in specific response to their role in the GATS construction: 
...the Big 5, their multinational clients and the WTO coalesce into a mutually reinforcing project that supports transnational systems of market regulation in which professional services...are to be governed by 'laws' of supply and demand. Traditional professional regulation, such as those historically produced between professional associations and the nation state, are identified as alien to this emerging field... (Suddaby et al., 2007, p. 346)

	Consistent with their characterization as transnationally aligned actors, the Big 4 played significant roles in the evolution of the International Accounting Standards Committee, predecessor of IASB (Tamm Hallström, 2004), and in the development and implementation of the resulting IFRS. Employees of these firms held appointments as IASC board members, experts, and steering committees project managers with responsibilities for standard development (Botzem, 2012; Tamm Hallström, 2004). The firms were active in funding IASC and continued to provide substantial financial support to the IASB upon reorganization (Larson & Kenny, 2011). The firms also legitimized IASB through active and regular participation in the comment process (Larson & Kenny, 2011). 
The adoption of IFRS by countries around the world has not only increased the influence of the Big 4 as providers of consistent standard interpretation, it has also provided substantial consulting opportunities. Because of the principles-based nature of the IFRS standards, the Big 4 are seen as valuable agents of consistent interpretation (Albu et al., 2011). All big transnational audit firms formed working groups and developed training materials to foster consistent interpretations and to avoid diverging application of the standards (Hoogendoorn, 2006; Tokar, 2005). All the Big 4 have established global IFRS resource divisions to aid in high quality standard development, as well as ultimate implementation (Tokar, 2005, p. 692). This scope of training and resources is not readily accessible by smaller firms. Consequently, large firms became key players on which companies rely for IFRS conversion and preparation of financial statements (Hoogendoorn, 2006). 
	The foregoing suggests that the Big 4 accounting firms have substantial reputational investment in the content of IFRS and considerable financial investment in their IFRS-related practice. Moreover, they are widely regarded in the literature as having shifted to a transnational orientation as regards regulation. It thus seems unlikely that they would object to a move toward more acceptance of IFRS on either normative or pragmatic grounds. The Big 4 can justify their support because IFRS, and its logic, has achieved a certain level of global respectability that was even endorsed by the SEC for other jurisdictions. 
The evolution of the Big 4 toward positions of normative and pragmatic alignment with IFRS have theoretical significance for the institutional status of U.S. GAAP. As argued by Oliver, the environment may have evolved to a condition of dissensus about US GAAP, that may be a precursor to its deinstitutionalization  (1992, p. 569). Specifically, Oliver argues that when powerful stakeholders find their current interests are in conflict with maintaining an older practice, they may reduce their support for the older practice. No crisis is required for this process to begin. Second, she argues when there is a breakdown in the extent of normative agreement over the preferability of a practice, then other practices will receive more serious attention. The upshot of this analysis is that, at the time of 2007 episode, there was no reason for the SEC to necessarily assume that the Big 4 would continue to support U.S. GAAP as the premiere set of standards. 

Empirical Episode
The Current Episode Conceptualized 
It is useful to conceptualize the current empirical episode using the previously discussed models. The episode of interest is the SEC's proposal to allow foreign registrants to file unreconciled, IFRS-based financial statements while continuing to require U.S. GAAP-based statements for domestic filers. Note that domestic issuers were not impacted, i.e. there was no institutional change proposed for them. In contrast, under the proposal foreign issuers were provided with increased flexibility and could file using U.S. GAAP, IFRS, or reconciled statements; i.e. a layering of IFRS alongside U.S. GAAP. In addition to creating two different conceptual outcomes, the existence of two differentially impacted groups has implication for the likely participation rates in the comment letter process.​[3]​
Two different institutions are targets of change in this episode. One is U.S. GAAP; it is being downgraded to one option among many for foreign registrants. Additionally the SEC itself is subject to substantive change. By creating condition where different practices are accepted, the SEC reduced its own power vis-a-vis other standard setters. It created a subset of filers who are using standards that are only very indirectly under its influence. 
An important element in the Mahoney and Thelen (2010) model is the concept of variable veto power. Because the SEC has essentially absolute veto power over accounting standards used by U.S. registrants, it becomes necessary to answer the question why would the SEC even consider rules posed by challengers of any nature. The answer appears to be two-pronged, but in both instances related to the role of powerful transnational corporations. The simplest answer is that if powerful transnational registrants become too dissatisfied with SEC rules, they can simply flee the U.S. exchanges and trade on other well established and monitored exchanges. The more complicated answer relates to the possibilities of intervention and discipline by the U.S. Congress. It has been well documented that members of U.S  Congress receive substantial support from powerful transnational corporations and that Congress has passed accounting-related regulations consistent with the theorized interests of those corporations (Roberts, Dwyer, & Sweeney, 2003; Roberts & Bobek, 2004; Thornburg & Roberts, 2008). It is also documented that Congress will threaten sanctions when powerful corporations disagree with proposed accounting standards (Beresford, 2001; Morgenson, 2001; Zeff, 1997; 2002). These possibilities explain why the SEC, in spite of its technically absolute veto power, must as a matter of pragmatics consider challenger rules when the challengers are influential enough and unified enough. 
Prior to the proposal, publicly available evidence suggested that the transnational challenger coalition included many transnational registrants and foreign and transnational associations, but importantly did not include the transnational accounting firms. However, it is interesting to note that the SEC has framed the problem so that in order to agree with the SEC, a participant must oppose the currently institutionalized practice of U.S. GAAP. This may have been a signal of the response the SEC expected.  
	Primary data include 118 comment letters received by the SEC in response to this proposal and the SEC’s final ruling issued after the comment process was completed. Secondary data include comments to (1) the 2000 Concept Release exploring the issue of reconciliation for foreign issuers, and (2) the 2007 Concept Release exploring allowing domestic companies an option of using IFRS. We required the 2000 data to support our expectation that a group of previously divided set of elites, the transnational players, had become more unified, and that this strengthened coalition of transnational challengers was important to SEC dropping its resistance.
	The comment letters are analyzed using latent content analysis, where the intention is to uncover underlying categories of meaning (Berg, 2004), as opposed to narrow counts of words and terms. Two coders read the letters to identify theoretically established categories and the type of legitimacy communicated by the participants. The preliminary differences in coding were discussed and either resolved or coded as ‘‘other’’ if irresolvable. A limitation of the study is its restriction to primarily a single regulatory episode that is only one event in a long process of underlying regulatory change; this sampling problem is common to all empirical research. 
Comment letters were chosen as a reasonable but imperfect proxy for the actors’ positions. On the one hand, because they are public, comment letters are highly sanitized versions of actual position. On the other hand, again because they are public, they are hard to refute or turn around and therefore arguably a proxy of the most likely actual position. 

Phase One: Analysis of Positions Taken and Rhetoric Used by Respondents
In the first phase, the type of respondent was recorded based on the categories suggested in prior research (e.g., Mezias, 1990; Suddaby et al., 2007): individuals, institutional users of financial information, preparers of financial information, audit and other professional firms, professional associations, trade associations, and regulatory agencies. Next, respondents were categorized based on the two dimensions of the D & Q model. Due to their lack of resources, individual respondents were classified as fringe players. Institutional users, preparers, audit and other professional firms, trade and professional associations, and regulatory agencies were considered dominant players due to their availability of resources, position of power, and/or social status (Djelic & Quack, 2003). While the extent of their dominance varies, these groups have significantly greater resources than individual users of the financial information. To capture the impact of geographic scope, respondents were coded as domestic, transnational, or foreign. We researched the participants and categorized them based on their local, national, or international focus and/or presence. An important factor in the classification was their geographic scope of operations.
We analyzed responses based on the position taken and the rhetoric used to support that position. In order to become a viable alternative, the new practice has to obtain and retain legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2002; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), and rhetoric is a tool of persuasion used in the process of creating perceived legitimacy. Greenwood et al. (2002) identify both pragmatic and normative​[4]​ legitimacy as types that are important in developing support for a new practice. Pragmatic legitimacy involves portraying a practice as beneficial for a specific constituency, and as such is often self-interested (Greenwood et al., 2002; Suchman, 1995). Normative legitimacy involves portraying the practice as fitting within currently established prescriptions, as a “right thing to do” and is more likely to reflect a concern for broader interests (Greenwood et al., 2002; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Suchman, 1995).   
We expected that proponents of the SEC's proposal for change would criticize the pragmatic legitimacy of reconciling IFRS to U.S. GAAP (Greenwood et al., 2002). Prior literature suggests the following rhetorical themes may be used to frame the pragmatic weaknesses of the current practice: excessive cost to registrants, excessive complexity, lack of usefulness, and lack of material differences between the standards (Jamal et al., 2008). We note that these particular references to the pragmatics, with their focus on market operations, are consistent with the widely accepted neoliberal market ideology which is argued to be the foundation of the current transnational financial architecture (Humphrey et al., 2009). Proponents were not expected to attack the normative legitimacy of reconciling IFRS to U.S. GAAP. This is because reconciliation provides information that arguably makes standard differences more transparent for investors, which is an issue of normative importance.
While we did not expect proponents to attack the normative legitimacy of U.S. GAAP, we did expect them to support the normative legitimacy of the IASB and IFRS-based reporting. In that regard, we anticipated themes relating to the alignment of IFRS with established notions such as investor information needs and transparency in financial reporting (Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2005; Ball, 2006). We also expected proponents to reference the legitimacy of IASB as a standard-setting body. Themes such as IASB quality, independence, and funding sufficiency were expected to be observed in this regard. Proponents were also expected to convey the pragmatic benefits of IFRS-based reporting. The following themes were anticipated: greater investment opportunities, lower cost of preparation, and lower cost of capital (Ball, 2006; Jamal et al., 2008; Jermakowicz & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2005; Hopkins et al., 2008). 
We expected opponents to focus on the normative legitimacy of the existing practice, and to question the normative legitimacy of the proposed alternative. This focus on normative legitimacy is expected because, if the proposed alternative is not normatively preferred, pragmatic benefits are harder to sell. 

Phase Two: Respondents Included in the SEC's Final Ruling
	In the second phase, we analyzed the source and content of responses that the SEC referenced in support for its final ruling. Similar to Bozanic et al. (2012), we use this approach as a way of teasing out the players that were most influential on the SEC and that the SEC believes are most credible in its justification of its ruling to other members of the public.

Phase Three: Analysis of Positions Taken on SEC’s Future Role 
	As previously discussed, the SEC's role going forward is an issue of some tension to both the SEC and the other institutional players. Historically, the scope of the SEC's jurisdiction and its ability to dictate accounting practices for such a large set of registrants has been a substantial source of power. The proposal results in a de facto reduction of the SEC's power as it creates a subset of filers who are using standards that are only very indirectly under the SEC's influence. While the SEC has some degree of input into the IFRS process, that influence is slight when compared to the power it has over U.S. GAAP. One way in which this power could be recovered is if the SEC was to obtain more control over IFRS in the future. Therefore, in the third phase of analysis we separately examine comments made by participants relating to the SEC's role going forward. 
Results 
Respondent Type 
The highest level of participation was seen from preparer corporations and trade associations. Preparers provided 34 out of 118 comments (29%) and trade associations 32 out of 118 (27%). Transnational audit and other professional service firms send in 9% of the letters. Professional associations and regulatory agencies accounted for 11% and 8% of the comments, respectively. Individuals provided 14 out of 118 comments (12%). Institutional users of financial information, such as rating agencies, and other user surrogates provided 5 out of 118 comments (4%). In some cases, participants could fit into more than one category. That applies to globally active financial firms, including Citibank, HSBC, and UBS, which were coded as preparers but are also users of financial information. Details on the participants and classification are presented in Appendix 1. 
European-based players dominated the process; they provided 54 out of a total of 118 letters. Comments were received from European organizations and preparers, trade groups, and regulatory agencies located in seven EU countries. There are a significant  number of European companies trading on the American financial markets who are already required to file on other exchanges using a variant of IFRS that differs from that exempted in the SEC proposal, therefore the level of interest by European filers is not surprising. Two responses were received from Australian organizations. Asia’s participation was limited to the Korean Accounting Standards Board. Developing and transition economies generally did not comment. 
As indicated in Table 1, transnational participants provided 69 out of 118 comments, followed by the domestic players with 29 comments and foreign players with 20. These data support the growing literature maintaining that regulation and governance are becoming increasingly transnational (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006).
Insert Table 1 Here
Phase One Results: Positions Taken and Rhetoric Used by Respondents
Three levels of position were coded: oppose the change; support the change, and call for broader change. The third coding level was required because the SEC proposed to eliminate the reconciliation requirement only for filers using the English version of IFRS as published by the IASB (SEC, 2007a). However, a substantial number of respondents are already required to file elsewhere using a different variant of IFRS. These respondents were among the most likely to call for broader change to include acceptance of their IFRS variant. 
Comments supporting the change accounted for 82 percent of all responses. Foreign and transnational players, including audit firms, overwhelmingly favored the proposal and supported the acceptance of IFRS statements from foreign issuers without U.S. GAAP reconciliation. Out of 33 preparers supporting the change, 18 comments (55%) came from the financial firms that also use financial statements of other companies to make investment decisions. These firms were uniform in their support for the proposal while they did not provide a single comment on the same issue for the 2000 Concept Release. Most proponents advocated waiving the reconciliation not only for users of the approved English version of IFRS but for certain jurisdictional and translated versions of IFRS. For example, 
We strongly recommend that the Commission will eliminate the U.S. GAAP reconciliation requirement for companies that publish their financial statements in accordance to widely used high-quality jurisdictional variants of IFRS, such as IFRS as adopted by the EU (SEC, 2007a: Nokia).

Not surprisingly, 67% of the letters recommending broader change came from the European participants asking for acceptance of the EU’s version of IFRS. 
On the domestic side, eleven out of the twelve U.S. individuals who commented on the proposal opposed the change. Some deemed the proposal to be premature while others argued for keeping the status quo. For example, a letter submitted by two academics urged the SEC “not to succumb to this growing hegemonic pressure from the London based IASB and others” to remove the required reconciliation (SEC, 2007a: Agbejule & Burrowes).  
We next analyzed respondents' rhetoric. Proponents justified their positions by attacking the pragmatic legitimacy of the current approach and by endorsing the pragmatic and normative legitimacy of the proposed change. Many proponents referred to the high cost of the existing process, the minimal differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, and the lack of usefulness of the reconciliation for investors. For example,
We fully support the Commission's proposal to accept IFRS financial statements from FPls without reconciliation to US GAAP. This reconciliation still absorbs substantial resources. However, the benefits which it affords users have considerably diminished as the IASB and FASB have progressed in their convergence efforts, so that reconciliation differences have become largely minor technical points or purely historical "legacy" items reflecting former differences which have now disappeared for new transactions, e.g. goodwill (SEC, 2007a: Novartis).

More seamless international markets, lower cost of capital for preparers, and increased investment opportunities for U.S. investors were other pragmatic themes, as illustrated by the following quote from a professional association in Scotland. 
With business operating globally, a single set of global financial reporting standards is necessary in order to enhance investor confidence, by facilitating analysis of financial statements on a comparable basis. This ultimately will contribute to a lower cost of capital for businesses and freedom for companies to list on different stock exchanges. This will be of benefit to the US by making it more attractive for foreign companies to list in the US, and providing greater choice for US investors (SEC, 2007a: Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland).

The comparability argument is curious as acceptance of IFRS statements by the U.S. markets introduces a second set of standards that users have to navigate. That would appear to make comparability across companies more elusive. 
Proponents also presented IFRS as a normatively acceptable alternative. The supporting rhetoric emphasized the high quality of IFRS standards and the adequate transparency of the IASB's processes. They also argued the minimal differences between GAAP and IFRS would mean that investors would likely suffer no negative impact:  
We fully support the proposal to eliminate the IFRS – U.S. GAAP reconciliation. We believe that IFRS financial statements provide high-quality and transparent information to users of financial statements. The recent efforts towards convergence by the IASB and the FASB have resulted in substantially similar sets of accounting standards and we do not believe that investors would make different investment decisions for the same company if the company prepared its financial statements under IFRS or U.S. GAAP (SEC, 2007a: Deutsche Bank).

	The focus of the transnational and foreign proponents on normative legitimacy may be explained by a desire to position their support within the established norms of public interest and investor protection. For example, transnational audit firms highlighted the independence of IASB standard-setting process and the high quality of IFRS.
IASB was constituted with a commitment to “develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable, and enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparent, and comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help participants in the world’s capital markets and other users make economic decisions.” Given the composition of the IASB, IFRS are issued through a robust process that is transparent to the public and reflect the collective input of technicians and practitioners from around the world (SEC, 2007a: Ernst & Young). 

PwC and D&T were the only two of the Big 4 who commented on both the 2000 IFRS-related Concept Release and the 2007 Proposed Rule. In 2000, these two firms supported the reconciliation requirement. Below is the response of PwC to the Concept Release in 2000, using investor protection as the norm in support of its argument:
We do not believe that a solid case has been presented for relaxing the reconciliation requirement. In recent years, U.S. markets have shown themselves to be significantly focused on a single figure of earnings. Bringing IAS into the domestic marketplace at this point means that there would be two (and quite different) measures of earnings, which is apt to lead to confusion (SEC, 2000: PwC).

In contrast, and despite the fact that GAAP and IFRS continued to have significant differences in 2007, the two firms of PwC and D&T experienced a turn-around in their positions, and argued in 2007 to end the reconciliation requirement. Now arguing the normative acceptability of IFRS, for example:
Acceptance of IFRS without a U.S. GAAP reconciliation should not be based on how close its standards are to U.S. GAAP, but on the quality of the standards and the sufficiency of the information they present to investors. In this regard, we believe that the quality and transparency of IFRS is sufficient to eliminate the reconciliation to U.S. GAAP (SEC, 2007a: PwC).

So publicly, by 2007, transnational audit firms were no longer sole GAAP supporters but had become challengers, advocating for a layering of IFRS alongside U.S. GAAP for foreign filers. Their public positions were now coaligned with those of other transnationals who had been challenging the use of GAAP for some time. Ironically, at the same time, in responses to the 2007 Concept Release exploring IFRS for domestic issuers, the firms did not support layering of standards citing difficulties related to the comparability of IFRS and U.S. GAAP and advocated for a more definitive commitment to IFRS for domestic reporting:
We believe that granting an option to domestic issuers to use IFRS without a plan and timetable for requiring all domestic issuers to adopt IFRS would hinder comparability in financial reporting and run counter to the goal of promoting a single set of high-quality, globally-accepted accounting standards. A mixed IFRS-U.S. GAAP regime that would result from an elective system would increase complexity in the financial reporting system for preparers, auditors, users and educators because of the need to maintain knowledge of both IFRS and U.S. GAAP (SEC, 2007c: KPMG).

While determining the exact reason for the double standard for domestic vs international filers is beyond the scope of this paper, what is clear is that by 2007 the Big 4 firms were fully committed to IFRS, and no longer even modest supporters of US GAAP as a long-term solution.
	Some of the most interesting and contradictory responses were made by domestic organizations. The American Accounting Association (AAA) is one domestic organization that did not present a unified perspective. Two opposing comments were received from different committees of AAA. Although both letters cited prior research, the committees came to different conclusions. The Financial Reporting Policy Committee of the Financial Accounting and Reporting Section of the AAA opposed the proposal, challenging its normative legitimacy. In this regard, their rhetoric focused on the usefulness of the current practice for investors, as follows:  
Our review of the academic research literature does not support the SEC’s proposal to eliminate the U.S. GAAP – IFRS reconciliation requirement for foreign private issuers. The research on the IFRS-U.S. GAAP reconciliation suggests that material differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP exist and that information contained in the reconciliations are reflected in investment decisions made by U.S. investors (SEC, 2007a: Financial Reporting Policy Committee of the AAA).	

In contrast, the Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the AAA supported the proposal, as follows: 

Financial statements based on IFRS can provide good financial reports that are equivalent to those based on U.S. GAAP. While there are differences in the financial reporting environment (governance, legal regime, audit, and securities regulation) among countries, the SEC should not wait until all elements of the financial reporting environment are harmonized on a global basis, even assuming that harmonization were possible and desirable. Allowing foreign companies to use IFRS without costly reconciliations to U.S. GAAP is likely to make U.S. stock exchanges more competitive and provide useful feedback to U.S. accounting standard setters about the efficacy of their standards (SEC 2007a: Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the AAA).

We note that this committee references the implied desirability of market tests of standards and the pragmatic issue of costly reconciliation in its argument. This is consistent with Büthe and Mattli (2011) emphasis on the market dimension of global standard-setting where standards compete for dominance.
	Another interesting contrast was observed in the position taken by the New York State Society of CPAs (NYSSCPA) and the AICPA as represented by its Center for Audit Quality. The NYSSCPA is one of the largest and oldest state accounting organizations in the U.S. The society was established in 1897 and has approximately 28,000 members (NYSSCPA, 2010). It is a long-time publisher of a well-respected journal, and has historically been an active participant in accounting and auditing debates. Its position was that the proposed change is premature and normatively challenged: 
As the Commission acknowledges in the proposed rule, convergence of IFRS and 
U.S. GAAP is far from complete, and significant differences remain….These differences will create an uneven competitive field for domestic and foreign registrants and will make it difficult for investors to compare the performance of companies from different geographies (SEC, 2007a: New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants).

In contrast to the NYSSCPA, The AICPA Center for Audit Quality supported the proposal. Normally these associations might both be expected to take a protectionist stance in support of existing domestic regulation. However, the AICPA argued for change, as follows: 
Overall, the Center supports the elimination of the U.S. GAAP reconciliation for foreign private issuers using IFRS, which we believe is an important step in the process toward development of a single-set of high-quality globally-accepted accounting standards. In addition, we do not believe that the elimination of the U.S. GAAP reconciliation should be predicated on the adequacy or continuation of the convergence process, nor on the development of further guidance in areas not currently addressed by IFRS (SEC, 2007a: AICPA Center for Audit Quality).

Other opposition was primarily voiced by certain professional associations and domestic individuals. These opponents stressed the normative legitimacy of the current approach. Their rhetoric focused on investor usefulness and standards quality. Jack Ciesielski, a member of FASB's Investors Technical Advisory Committee, highlighted some of these points:
The reconciliation currently provides investors with visibility into corporate earnings arising from the choice of accounting methods. As currently formulated, this proposal will turn investors’ vision into blindness. It would run counter to the Commission’s public policy mission (SEC, 2007a: Jack Ciesielski).

Opponents also attacked the normative legitimacy of the proposed new approach, expressing concerns about the quality of IFRS, lack of enforcement at the IASB, and the uniformity of IFRS implementation. 
The IFRS are not as of yet of the same quality as U.S. GAAP. The problems of interpretation that a principle-based system such as IFRS engenders are compounded by the fact that there is no effective enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance (SEC, 2007a: William Craven).

Opponents were also concerned about comparability problems that could arise due to inconsistent application across countries. Historically, when a country adopts IFRS, it is not always exactly as issued by the IASB but as approved (and often modified) by some local endorsement mechanism. These processes can result in jurisdictional differences.
The idea of one universal IFRS is largely a myth. There are actually numerous versions of nationally recognized IFRS: there is an Australian IFRS, Hong Kong IFRS, etc., an actual potpourri of standards. While the IASB is attempting to reverse this little-discussed situation and elevate its own brand, it is misleading at this point to assume that other sovereign nations have or will abdicate their national interest to a body over which they have no control. Why then should we? (SEC, 2007a: Gaylen Hansen, CPA).

Finally, one commenter offered a somewhat protectionist concern about the regulator's independence, as follows:
Abeit indirectly, FASB would be beholden to IASB’s donors as it was to its donors before SOX. That is not likely in the interests of investors, markets or the public (SEC, 2007a: Lawrence Cunningham).

As Congress is one of the players that has the influence over the SEC, public opposition to the proposal was limited to two senators who voiced their concerns as below:

While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act preserved the SEC’s authority to set its own accounting standards, the SEC’s proposal to treat standards set by the IASB as generally accepted, whether expressly or impliedly, is an end-run around Congress’ intent in establishing the independent funding mechanism and other qualifications necessary to justify reliance on a standards-setter other than the SEC itself (SEC, 2007a: Jack Reed and Christopher Dodd, U.S. Senate).

For domestic participants, layering of IFRS contributed to “divide and conquer” as perceived indirect impact of the change did not evoke significant and united opposition.


Phase Two Results: Respondents Referenced in the SEC's Final Ruling
	We analyzed the particular comments that the SEC chose to rely on and reference in its final ruling. We believe this analysis sheds light on which particular parties were most influential on the SEC; it also sheds light on which parties the SEC believed would add most credibility to its final ruling. 
	The SEC disproportionately referenced comments from the transnational auditing and professional service firms. While 9% of comment letters were received from this group, they accounted for about 30% of the references made in the final ruling. More generally, the SEC relied heavily on transnational respondents in its choice of letters to reference in the final ruling. Approximately 73% of the comment letters referenced in the SEC’s final ruling came from transnational participants, while these types of participants represented only 58% of total population. 
	The Commission drew on responses from the Big 4 transnational firms to support several topics in its final ruling. One such topic was the SEC's discussion of its own role. In these instances, the SEC seemed to have referenced comments that adopted a positive framing of its appropriate role going forward. That is, the SEC referenced those comments that were framed in terms of what respondents thought the SEC should do, as opposed to what it shouldn't do. For example, PwC and Deloitte were referenced for the following statements:
Most commenters that addressed the role of the Commission with respect to the IASB felt that the Commission should continue to participate in the IASB and IFRIC’s due process. Many felt that continued interaction with the IASB through IOSCO was appropriate (SEC, 2007b, p. 14-15).

This is somewhat in contrast to many of the comments that were negatively framed in terms of what the SEC should not do, particularly as it related to the issuance of separate guidance. It appears the SEC used the Big 4 responses to create a favorable image of the commenters' overall position relating to its forward going role. 
	The SEC also relied heavily on Big 4 responses to support the final ruling paragraphs that address whether a specific level of convergence must be demonstrated before the reconciliation was eliminated. Three of the Big 4 were cited in support of a statement that such a level of convergence was not necessary. Additionally, Grant Thornton was referenced in support of a claim that auditors are already more than familiar enough to audit unreconciled statements and that doing away with the reconciliation would actually accelerate the incentives to develop IFRS capabilities.
	The SEC did not ignore opponents' comments in the final ruling. Impression management theories suggest that opponents would be referenced in a public document to convey the sense that the process was legitimate and all voices were heard. That said, the SEC did not reference opponents in proportion to their participation in the process. Approximately 18% of the comments opposed the proposal but this group accounted for about 15% of the total references in the final ruling. For example, the AAA Committee that supported the proposed ruling was referenced, while the opposing AAA Committee was not. The AICPA, which supported the proposal, was cited eight times in the final ruling while the opposing NYSSCPA was cited only twice.  
	Some of the opponents' topical concerns recognized in the final ruling were related to the adequacy of the IASB's organizational structure, as well as its lack of financial independence. On these topics, the SEC referred to comments from several domestic organizations with investor protection missions. The SEC also noted opponents' concerns relating to the sufficiency of the present level of convergence between IFRS and US GAAP. For example, SEC referenced the letters from NYSSCPA, Maverick Capital, and Investors Technical Advisory Committee stating that “many of those not in favor of the amendments believed that convergence to date was insufficient to merit the removal of the reconciliation requirement at this time”. In a balancing effort the SEC referenced contrasting comments on the same topic by the Corporate Reporting Users’ Forum (representing professional investors and analysts), Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch in stating that “other commenters representing users of financial statements, though, noted that the reconciling information is not very useful to them in evaluating IFRS financial statements” (SEC, 2007b, p. 19-20). It is important to note that the SEC refers to financial firms as users of financial information. Given that classification, it would appear that users overwhelmingly supported the proposal.
In the final ruling the SEC’s language suggested that it has come to accept the prevailing logic of the evolved financial architecture, at least as it relates to the market determination of standards. The SEC relied on comments from E&Y and PwC (among others) in support of the following statement “Many commenters believed that market forces and demand for comparable information in global capital markets will continue to provide sufficient incentive for further convergence...” (SEC, 2007b, p. 20). In a later comment the SEC reflects its own conversion to the power of the market logic as follows: “We anticipate that the process towards convergence will continue, because capital markets will provide an ongoing incentive for a common set of high-quality globally accepted accounting standards...” (SEC, 2007b, p. 21). 


Phase Three Results: Positions Taken on SEC’s Future Role 
 	The SEC has historically held a powerful role in the area of accounting standards regulation. That power came primarily from its tight rein over the accounting standards to be used by companies trading on the U.S. exchanges, rather than from its participation in other standard setting arenas. Gravitation toward IFRS has considerable likelihood of reducing the SEC's de facto power relative to other organizations. Accordingly, we analyze the comments that related particularly to the SEC's role going forward.
Fifty two respondents (44%) commented on this issue. Of those, transnational and foreign participants accounted for 69% and 17% of responses, respectively. Most transnational responses came from preparers and auditors. Most foreign responses came from the regulatory agencies and trade associations. In absolute number, highest response was from preparers and trade associations. All six of the largest international accounting firms commented on this issue. As illustrated below, a number of respondents expressed fairly strong admonitions to the SEC regarding its forward-going role.
	The majority of comments on the SEC’s role reflected one of the following three overlapping themes: (1) the SEC must not be overbearing in its interaction with IASB and must recognize its changed and lesser role; (2) the SEC should be discouraged from issuing rules-based interpretations that conflict with the principles-based paradigm of IFRS; and relatedly (3) the SEC should not issue interpretations effective only for U.S. companies as that might effectively create yet another jurisdictional version of IFRS.
	General cautions regarding the SEC's less powerful role going forward were advanced by many types of respondents. One transnational corporation offered the following advice:
In order to achieve the goal of a single set of high quality global accounting standards, the SEC must recognize and accept that its role is different and less direct than its oversight role with the FASB and that it should act primarily through IOSCO (SEC, 2007a: Microsoft).

One of the strongest admonishments regarding the SECs role came from an individual: 
Since the IASB primarily serves two economic blocks, if the SEC attempts to exert direct influence on the IASB, the EC will respond by redoubling its effort to do the same. The result will be a transatlantic soccer match, with the IASB being the ball (SEC, 2007a: Mladek).
Similarly, international accounting firms, international professional associations, and international trade associations reminded the SEC of its likely lesser role moving forward. 
We therefore urge the SEC to show caution in managing its relationship with the IASB and IFRIC as well as taking care about the SEC’s own impact on IFRS as a body of literature. It is particularly important to ensure that the position of IFRIC as the only formal issuer of interpretations of IFRS is not undermined (SEC, 2007a: Institute of Chartered Accountants).

The SEC should be prepared to accept that it will naturally have a different role with regard to an international body. This is essential to the development of a truly international accounting framework. The SEC’s differing relationships with the IASB and FASB are well understood in the market; indeed, it will be important for the SEC to preserve the present bounds of that relationship and manage its relationship with the IASB in such a way as to maintain the independence and international legitimacy of the IASB, and robustness of its processes (SEC, 2007a: Institute of International Finance).

	As to concerns regarding the SEC providing its own IFRS interpretations, three of Big 4 international accounting firms cautioned the SEC against issuing separate guidance. The accounting firms were joined by other types of respondents in concerns about separate SEC guidance. The UBS, a transnational wealth management firm, voiced the following concerns:
We are concerned that the SEC may become too involved in the interpretation of IFRS. The SEC has interpreted and changed US GAAP many times in the past. SEC speeches at annual SEC/AICPA conferences and SEC staff accounting bulletins are examples of that activity. The SEC must resist the urge to unilaterally interpret IFRS (SEC, 2007a: UBS). 

Deloitte took perhaps the most generous position on the SEC's role as interpreter, in discussing circumstances where the IASB might fail to provide resolution: 
We also encourage regulators to communicate effectively with the IASB and its staff on issues that may need resolution. Part of this communication would be any necessary action by the IASB or its interpretive body (International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee — IFRIC) to address the issues raised. If the IASB process were not to resolve or address the issue, then we believe it would be necessary for regulators to consider providing the appropriate guidance (SEC, 2007a: Deloitte).	

	A final concern was that the SEC would in effect create yet another variant of IFRS. The London Investment Banking Association encouraged the SEC to resist any pressure to produce extensive guidance at the risk of producing “a jurisdictionally distinct SEC IFRS” (SEC, 2007a: London Investment Banking Association). This concern was similarly expressed by Lloyds, who cautioned against excessive SEC interpretation “...could lead to further jurisdictional variants.” (SEC 2007a: Lloyds TSB).
DISCUSSION
	We examined an episode of regulatory change in which the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission made a significant move toward accepting international financial accounting standards for certain foreign registrants. Theoretical insight for the study was provided by elements of institutional theory, especially as it relates to change mechanisms and to the construction of regulation. Documentary empirical data were drawn from the comment letters provided to the SEC in response to the proposed change, as well as from the SEC's final ruling document and from related 2000 and 2007 Concept Releases. This paper contributes to the study of incremental institutional change by examining the role of the public behavior of the regulator and of influential regulatees, in the context of a change that had been previously adamantly resisted. The multi-level examination allows for a deeper understanding of institutional change through the views and actions of the agents that are involved and the corresponding change mechanisms that are adopted.
	Our initial empirical analysis focused on the positions taken and rhetoric used by respondents to the proposal. Respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of the proposal. Proponents were primarily transnationals and generally argued their support based on pragmatics and ease of market operations. Opponents were primarily individuals and investor surrogates that tended to argue more normatively from the perspectives of financial statements users' needs.   
	The empirics revealed some interesting contradictions in responses from domestic academic and professional accounting associations. On the one hand, the national-level professional accounting association, the AICPA, sided with the transnational majority in supporting the proposal and the necessary concomitant weakening of SEC’s influence. In contrast, the largest state-level professional accounting association, the NY State Society of CPAs opposed the proposal. In prior literature, accounting scholars have documented the AICPA's seeming acceptance of the global scope and market logic in several instances, in particular their efforts related to the AICPA Vision Project and the global Cognitor designation (e.g., Baker, 2008; Fogarty, Radcliffe & Campbell, 2006; Shafer & Gendron, 2005). Thus it may not be surprising that the AICPA appears more ready than the NYSCPA to give up local standards in favor of standards that allegedly smooth market operations and international capital flows. It may be that the AICPA is no longer domestically allied, even though it is a domestic institution. In contrast, the NYSSCPA appears to remain ideologically a domestic institution that supports domestic standards when they believe those standards to be normatively preferable. 
	Contradictory recommendations were received from two different committees of the American Accounting Association. This conflict in a single domestic organization may further reflect the underlying friction, at the domestic level, related to the transnationalization of the accounting standard setting. The AAA committee supporting the proposal is responsible for the coordination of all activities related to financial accounting standard setting and was chaired at the time by a partner of the transnational accounting firm, Grant Thornton. Their response presented the benefits of the global market where “regulatory completion would be beneficial to the development of good accounting standards” (SEC 2007a: Financial Accounting Standards Committee of the AAA). The committee connected to the Financial Accounting and Reporting section of the AAA, which opposed the proposal, was more focused on the needs of U.S. investors. 
	The data contained some strong and sometimes emotional comments on the SEC's role going forward. Transnational and foreign participants expressed concern that the SEC would have too much influence over the IASB in general. Further, participants were concerned that the SEC would effectively create yet another jurisdictional variant of IFRS if it issued too much guidance that applied only to U.S. registrants. Although the Big 4 framed their views on the SEC's role in a more positive way than many respondents, their message was still generally one favoring limited SEC involvement. 


Interpretations and Implications 	 
This episode has implications for further movement toward accounting standard harmonization. Some respondents asserted that this was a move toward ultimate harmonization. In contrast, others noted that by agreeing to accept both U.S. GAAP and IFRS, the SEC appears to have removed a fairly substantial incentive for harmonization.  Harmonization, in concept, occurs when the decisions made by multiple nominally different regulators, each having its own groups of challengers and supporters, move toward each other. Theorizing merely about the self-interests of the powerful transnational filers seems to suggest that for them harmonization is a non-issue, because they are now able to file on most major exchanges using unreconciled IFRS. 
In this episode the SEC created an opportunity for foreign issuers to file with either unreconciled IFRS statements or U.S. GAAP, while continued to require U.S. firms to file using U.S. GAAP. This is conceptualized as institutional layering, a mechanism of change wherein a new set of rules is accepted alongside an existing set of rules without replacing the older rules. Integrating theorizing from Djelic and Quack (2003) and Mahoney and Thelen (2010), in the environment of essentially absolute veto power by the regulator, layering is more likely to occur when a sufficiently powerful set of transnational challengers come together in a coalition. Typically new layers are expected to challenge the existing institutions but, given segmentation that it provides, such approach can actually slow down further change. The confluence of national and transnational institutions contributes to hybrid solutions which lessen disturbances for the existing institutions and shape institutional continuity.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to know exactly why, between 2000 and 2007, the Big 4 came to join the coalition of other transnational challengers to U.S. GAAP for foreign SEC registrants. It could be, as Oliver (1992) argues that when the current interests of powerful stakeholders are in conflict with maintaining an older practice, they may reduce their support for the older practice. We have demonstrated how the financial interests of the Big 4 firms are related to increased use of IFRS. Additionally, it may be simply that enough normative support for IFRS had developed by that time that the Big 4 could publicly align with its supporters. It appears that the public shift of allegiance of the Big 4 firms, and their inclusion in the coalition of transnational challengers, is a factor in the timing of this change. Our study demonstrates that coalitions of transnational players able to promote and justify change not fully supported by domestic audience. The episode highlights how Big 4 engage in institutional change. There was an incremental evolution of their public position. The firms were not early proponents of the change given the normative legitimacy of the domestic standards. Once they came to support the removal of the reconciliation, Big 4 argued for choice in standards for foreign issuers but continued to support a single standard requirement for domestic issuers. Aware of the different transnational and domestic pressures, Big 4 are cautious in promoting further change even when their current interests seem in conflict with maintaining existing practices. 
The episode served to illustrate some of the complexities of current theoretical thinking about endogeneity of regulation, including the influence of transnational actors on allegedly domestic regulation, as well as global moves towards privatization of regulation. At the outset, the SEC appeared to have framed the proposal in a way that it was very likely to be supported by major transnational and foreign players. The ongoing  role already played by the Big 4 transnational accounting firms in IFRS development as well as the substantial financial opportunities in implementation suggest that the firms would favor the plan. Thus, while there did not appear to be much conflict or dissent in the comment process, the proposal itself was almost guaranteed based on known actions and agendas of the likely major respondents. Even so the SEC did not ignore dissenters and their arguments in its final ruling, creating at least an aura of having considered those arguments in the construction of the final ruling.
	Several elements of the analysis suggests that the SEC, in its public face, has succumbed to the evolved ideology favoring transnational levels of regulation that are subject to market tests. First we noted that, in contrast to the framing in prior research (e.g., Bozanic et al., 2012) the SEC's proposal was one that could create more choice, and thus allow market preferences to prevail. Second, we observed that the proposal was framed such that a proponent of U.S. domestic standards would have to oppose the proposal to express that support. Third, we observed that by the time the proposal developed, the Big 4 transnational accounting firms had shifted their public stance from being supporters of U.S. GAAP in the U.S. to joining the existing coalition of transnational challengers who were already well committed to IFRS. Finally, we found that the SEC chose to disproportionately rely on transnationals and particularly on the Big 4 firms in supporting the details of its final ruling. The accounting literature has repeatedly documented the Big 4's commitment to and dominant role in the new financial architecture; by allying itself strongly with these firms the SEC may or may not be revealing genuine acceptance of the ideology but the Commission is certainly demonstrating a pragmatic alignment with some of the most powerful players.	Another implication of our analysis is that the SEC's public statements of optimism regarding its own future role may not fully reflect the beliefs of respondents to its proposal. In its final ruling, the SEC chose not to reference any of the strong and relatively specific comments advising it to limit its role going forward. Instead, the Commission chose to reference more general comments of support largely from the Big 4 firms. This may be an attempt to put the best possible public face on loss of power in an attempt to manage impressions as it reconstructs its own future role. 
	Our study contributes to understanding the impact of internationalization forces on national level regulators. Previously, other authors have asserted that shifts being observed in accounting are just part of a much larger trend which involves moving away from sites of national level regulation toward a single global private sector standard setting. They characterize the outcome of this trend as “...simultaneous privatization and internationalization of governance” (Büthe & Mattli, 2011, p. 5). In that regard, however, the SEC of the 21 century faces a fragmented external environment. On the one hand, transnational corporations and the transnational audit firms favor internationalization of standards. These are among the most powerful of the regulatees and have the documented willingness to influence Congress as needed to manage the SEC. On the other hand, certain subsets of the U.S. public and certain members of Congress are known for their unusually exceptionalist attitude toward international matters. The SEC through the layering of the standards for some registrants may be pursuing what Bealing et al. (1996) called a multiple strategy response to a fragmented environment. The SEC has acquiesced from the perspective of powerful transnational constituency, but for the moment that acquiescence only applies to the transnational and foreign registrants. Thus, at least for the time being the SEC has satisfied its most powerful constituents, and has made a move consistent with the new transnational financial architecture, without ceding control over the standards used by its domestic registrants and risking the wrath of U.S. exceptionalists. 
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Table 1: Classification of Comment Letters by Position of Participants















Position 1 = oppose allowing foreign issuers to file with SEC using IFRS without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP
Position 2 = support as proposed by SEC
Position 3 = call for a broader acceptance than proposed by SEC






Name	Individuals	Institutional Users	Preparers	Auditors/ Prof Services	Trade Associations	Prof Associations	Regulatory Agencies
1	John C. Rader	x1	 	 	 	 	 	 





7	Financial Security Assurance Holdings	 	 	x3	 	 	 	 
8	Steven Balsam	x1	 	 	 	 	 	 
9	Robert Mladek	x1	 	 	 	 	 	 
10	Adebayo Agbejule and Ashley W. Burrowes	x1	 	 	 	 	 	 
11	Financial Reporting Standards Board, New Zealand	 	 	 	 	 	 	x3
12	Investors Technical Advisory Committee	 	x1	 	 	 	 	 
13	National Institute of Accountants, Australia	 	 	 	 	 	x2	 
14	Financial Accounting Standards Committee, AAA	 	 	 	 	 	x2	 
15	Novartis	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
16	Korea Actg Institute & Accounting Standards Board	 	 	 	 	 	 	x3
17	Daimler Chrysler	 	 	x3	 	 	 	 
18	London Investment Banking Association	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
19	The Association of German Banks	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
20	Delhaize Group	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
21	European Insurance CFO forum	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
22	Swish Federation of Industrial and Services Groups	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
23	Canadian Accounting Standards Board	 	 	 	 	 	 	x2
24	New Zealand Securities Commission	 	 	 	 	 	 	x3
25	BP	 	 	x3	 	 	 	 











37	Institute of Management Accountants	 	 	 	 	 	x2	 
38	Terry Warfiled	x1	 	 	 	 	 	 
39	Syngenta	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
40	Financial Reporting Council, UK	 	 	 	 	 	 	x3
41	Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, LLP	 	 	 	x3	 	 	 




46	International Capital Markets Association	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
47	Manulife Financial	 	 	x3	 	 	 	 
48	ING Group	 	 	x3	 	 	 	 
49	Swedish Export Credit Corporation	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
50	BusinessEurope	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
51	BT Group	 	 	x3	 	 	 	 
52	International Swaps and Derivatives Association	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
53	Financial Services Roundtable	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
54	Canadian Natural Resources Limited	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
55	Corporate Reporting Users' Forum	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
56	Nokia	 	 	x3	 	 	 	 











68	Center for Captial Markets Competitiveness	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
69	CalPers	 	x2	 	 	 	 	 
70	Citigroup	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
71	Group of North American Insurance Enterprises	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
72	Grant Thornton	 	 	 	x2	 	 	 
73	Ernst & Young	 	 	 	x3	 	 	 
74	Center for Audit Quality	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
75	Institute of International Finance	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
76	Standard & Poor's	 	x1	 	 	 	 	 
77	Council of Institutional Investors	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
78	New York City Bar	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
79	Institute of CA in England and Wales	 	 	 	 	 	x3	 
80	Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
81	AIG	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
82	Financial Reporting Policy Committee, AAA	 	 	 	 	 	x1	 
83	Microsoft	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
84	PricewaterhouseCoopers	 	 	 	x3	 	 	 
85	American Council of Life Insurers	 	 	 	 	x2	 	 
86	International Corporate Governance Network	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
87	Prudential	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 
88	Confederation of British Industry	 	 	 	 	x3	 	 
89	BDO	 	 	 	x3	 	 	 
90	Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson	 	 	 	x3	 	 	 
91	The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland	 	 	 	 	 	x3	 
92	Fitch Ratings 	 	x2	 	 	 	 	 












105	European Federation of Accountants	 	 	 	 	 	x3	 







113	American Academy of Actuaries	 	 	 	 	 	x1	 
114	Israel Accounting Standards Board	 	 	 	 	 	 	x3
115	NYSE Euronext	 	 	x2	 	 	 	 






Position 1 = oppose allowing foreign issuers to file with SEC using IFRS without reconciliation to U.S. GAAP
Position 2 = support as proposed by SEC










^1	 At the conceptual level they are indeed different. However, both U.S. GAAP and IFRS have been criticized for (differently) allowing opportunistic application. Thus, it remains unclear whether, at the application level, this difference is as significant as is often claimed
^2	 The actors involved in the change process have been classified as dominant vs fringe (Djelic & Quack, 2003), core vs peripheral (Davis et al., 1994), insider vs. outsider (Maguire & Hardy, 2009). The players that are known as dominant, core or insider are thought to be in the dominant elite position. In this study, consistent with Djelic and Quack (2003), dominant vs. fringe classification is used throughout. 
^3	 Contemporaneous with the proposed rule that we are studying, the SEC had also issued a 2007 SEC Concept Release. This release explored whether U.S. companies should be allowed to use IFRS. Not surprising, this release had significantly higher input from domestic participants than did the proposed rule that we study in this paper. 
^4	 The terminology is similar to Ruef and Scott (1998). Some researchers referred to this category as moral legitimacy (for example Greenwood et al., 2002; Suchman, 1995).
